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Economic Thresholds for Agroforestry Investment Options in New Zealand
Chair: Kevin L. O'Hara
Abstract:
The economic thresholds for agroforestry investment options were examined for
six farm sites in New Zealand. A combination of sheep and beef farming and the
afforestation of pastoral land with Pinus radiata was the specific silvopastoral system
analyzed. Four alternative investment structures with both a landowner and an
independent or outside investor were studied. The study looked at an owner-funded farm
forestry venture; a partnership where the partners employ a property manager; a 100%
investor owned property; and three joint ventures. Under the forestry Rights Registration
Act (1983), Joint Ventures are possible through the creation of a "profit a prendre." The
Agroforestry Estate Model and STANDPAK decision support models were used to
construct the cost and stand yield tables required for the analysis. Net present value and
internal rate of return were used for the economic analysis. The projects were examined
over a range of discount rates from 6-10%. The results of this research provide a tool for
landowners and investors considering investing in Pinus radiata independently or as a
partner in a Joint Venture in New Zealand.
Key Words: Pinus radiata. New Zealand, joint venture, forestry rights
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Introduction
The demand for wood products has led to the degradation of much of the planet's
native forests. As a result, there has been a global movement towards sustainable forest
practices and establishment of many hectares of intensive plantations of exotic species.
Given limited global wood supplies, many landowners and investors have become
interested in alleviating the pressure on the world's native forests. Hoping to enhance and
promote planted forests as sustainable and environmentally sound, many businesses have
been working with private landowners. Their goals have been to maximize both parties'
investment returns while simviltaneously in^roving the environment by planting
establishing forest plantations. The projects utilize a combination of land uses known as
agroforestry.

For the purpose of this study, agroforestry is defined as the management of

trees in combination with agricultural systems (Maclaren, 1993). The primary objectives
of agroforestry are multiple uses, products, and both economic and environmental
benefits. This study specifically examines silvopastoral systems. The ratio of trees to
pasture, as well as the intensity grazing and management can vary over the landscape. The
interest in sustainable plantation investments with farmers seems to be an eflFort by the
business community to move towards sustainable forms of development.
The New Zealand pastoral landscape is well suited for plantation forestry and to
supply a substantial portion of the world's timber.

A 1991 Report of the Forestry Joint

Venture Working Group noted that while it is recognized that the availability of land in
New Zealand suitable for the establishment of new large-scale commercial plantations is
limited, there is a vast resource of under-utilized private land suitable for forestry
(Ministry of Forestry, 1991).

While New Zealand has a long history of successful
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commercial radiata pine plantations, small-scale agroforestry plantations are being planting
by a sector of New Zealand's sheep and beef fermers.
According to the 1997 New Zealand Forest Owners Association, New Zealand's
27 million hectare landscape is divided as follows: 51% or 13.0 million hectares is pasture
and arable land and six percent or 1.5 million hectares is planted production forest. As of
June 1997, the area of exotic forest in ownership outside of the 17 major commercial
forest owners was 401,000 hectares or 1.5% of the total national resource. With a
program of accelerated afforestation on environmentally marginal private lands, a target of
4.2 million hectares in plantation forest could be achieved by the year 2020. At this target,
plantation forestry would stUl only account for 16% of New Zealand's land area whereas
farmland would still account for over 42%" (MoF, 1991). While there is a surplus of land
available for afforestation, there are also overseas investors interested in capitalizing on
the richness of New Zealand's plantable land resource.
This study examines the variables and parameters that drive New Zealand Pinus
radiata forestry investments and pastoral land conversion. It attempts to identify the
threshold points where the resources of the landowner and the cash capital resources of
the investor will be maximized.

Four alternative investment structures with both a

landowner and an independent or outside investor that illustrate a variety of land sizes,
scales of project and investment design are studied: 1) An owner-funded farm forestry
venture; 2) A partnership where the partners emjjtoy a property manager to buy, plant and
manage a property that was previously pasture land; 3) A 100% investor owned property
designed to maximize multiple uses and utilize the land in a way that is suited for it's
different physical attributes, productive capacities and resources for the land; 4) and joint
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ventures where an agreement between a landowner(s) and investor(s) imder the Forestry
Rights Registration Act 1983, whereby projSt from tree growing is apportioned to each
according to their input.

Background
While it is clear there are available agricultural lands for conversion and land
owners interested in planting trees, understanding the reasons why farmers plant trees is an
essential component of the investment decision. The impetus for a farmer's tree planting
is inextricably linked to the joint-venture opportunities available to overseas investors. It
appears that the incentive for converting land from pasture to woodlots is primarily
economic. However, some studies have suggested otherwise.
In 1986 Morey published the results of a study on farm forestry with a total sample
that represented about 8% of the estimated 45,000 fiill-time farmers in New Zealand.
Morey concluded that while there are many farm foresters who recognize the economic
returns from trees as well as amenity and aesthetic values, the uses for forest trees on
farms rated most highly by respondents were: in descending order of importance: shelter
for stock, shelter for house, landscape-aesthetics, best land use for steep and or low
productive land, and erosion control, wood for own use, increase farm value and profit
from sale (Morey, 1986). In addition, the most important reasons for not planting were
displaces agriculture, lack finance, inadequate returns, and returns too far in the fiiture.
Not surprisingly, economic motivations ranked as high amongst reasons for not planting as
they ranked low amongst uses for forest trees on the farm (Morey, 1986).
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Enevoldsen (1990) suggested the reason for the lower rankings of economic
concerns in Morey's (1986) work is that farmers simply are unaware of the economic
factors affecting profitability and value of a farm plantation. This suggests that farmers
could be motivated to plant trees simply by informing them about its profitability.
Enevoldsen concluded that ki some regions farmers planted trees mainly for erosion
control and landscape reasons, while elsewhere farmers planted to provide shelter and
shade for livestock and their homes. Motives related to profit were ranked lowest for
both groups. About 50% of the formers regarded farm cash flow as a constraint for
managmg trees, whereas about 40% were constrained by lack of on farm labor ... Of all
farmers with more than 7 ha in trees, 86% financed their plantations fi-om farm cash flow.
Borrowing and joint ventures had a remarkable low importance (2% and 6%)
(Enevoldson, 1990). Moreover, it is clear that a farmer's knowledge of parameters
affecting the profitability of plantations is very poor. None of the landowners knew what
it costs to establish radiata pine, only 4% were aware of thinning costs and only 18%
knew the value of a pruned stand at harvest (Enevoldson, 1990). Therefore, it appears
that education about the economic variables involved in planting and harvesting trees
might lead more farmers to convert a portion of their land to woodlots and increase the
investment opportunities for outside investors.
Most recently, Fairweather and SwafiBeld (1995) investigated the preferences of
stakeholders... for different land-use options involving forestry. Individuals expressed
preferences illustrating environmental effects for a range of technically feasible range of
land-use options, including forestry, agriculture, and conservation. Respondents who saw
trees as improving the land saw the role of large plantations for production on the hills and
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lower slopes and for soil conservation on the higher rainfall flats.

Moreover, respondents

preferring tree planting as a replacement for and or in combination with improved pasture
placed the greatest emphasis upon productive enhancement of the land resource. Visual
effects of land use were considered significant and when forestry was the preferred
primary land use, there was a preference for "naturalistic" shaped plantations. When the
respondents preferred multiple use forestry and grazing, there was a strong preference for
clearly defined land uses characterized by clear boimdaries. When conservation was the
primary land use objective, the "image of clean, open tussock grazing land was critical,
although it is important to note that small, clearly defined plantations were also acceptable
on hills and slopes" (Fairweather and Swaffield, 1995).
If the incentive to plant trees is not economic, what role do economics play in an
incentive for farmers to convert their land? What factors would encourage farmers to
convert their land and be receptive to alternative land use plans? More importantly, to
ensure a successfiil niche for small afforestation ventures, how can willing overseas
investors market their idea to a community that doesn't seem to react strongly to the
economic rewards that come fi-om retiring their paddocks fi-om grazing and planting
woodlots? A time series study of four previous surveys of New Zealand farmers and
farm woodlot owners which have been conducted since 1982, shows that [in November
1994] the replacement of a forestiy encouragement grant by tax deductibility of forestry
expenditures changed the financial and profit motivations for planting. Many farmers
with zero or marginal tax rates were severely disadvantaged by the changes, having little
or nothing to which they could apply deductions. Consequently, "this sxirvey found that
lack of finance is a constraint to tree planting second only to displacement of agriculture
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amongst farmers generally, and is the leading reason for not establishing greater areas
amongst planters and intending planters (Morey, 1986).
It is clear that in the absence of subsidies and government incentives, it is the
responsibility of those who see potential long-term benefits in agroforestry to seek new
solutions to finance their projects. Joint ventures are coordinated options that can relieve
the landowner of the financial burden of forestry investment, but Morey's (1986) study
found that they were considered much less effective in achieving the best price for the
grower by respondents. One explanation for this assessment of joint ventures could be that
fanners, even agroforesters, do not expect that the economic returns fi-om farm forestry
will be high enough to attract urban based investment capital (Morey, 1986). A second
explanation for reservations about joint ventures is the issue of profit sharing and fixture
market control (Morey, 1986). Finally, the lack of enthusiasm for joint ventures might also
be a manifestation of agriculture versus forestry land use conflicts (Morey, 1986).
Recognizing that agroforestry projects are an intricate web of economic, social and
political incentives and prejudices, an increase in the nimiber of publications, organizations
and investors interested in planting trees suggests that there is a niche for further
exploration into the benefits of planting trees on pastoral landscapes.

Area of Study
Assuming farmers are willing to plant trees, this study identifies three regions of
New Zealand's North Island that were suitable for maximizing forestry enterprises. They
are the Coastal Bay of Plenty, Wairarapa and Taranaki. The criteria for selection were site
index, proximity to a port and sawmills, and significant land available for conversion.
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The Coastal Bay of Plenty has been identified by the Ministry of Forestry as the
'The Central North Island wood supply region.'

The dominant land use in this region is

pastoral farming. The sheep and beef farming indmtry in the Bay of Plenty has been
shrinking rapidly and current statistics suggest there are less than 300 sheep and beef
farms in the region larger than 50ha (MAF, 1997). The rapid decline is attributed to
forestry, dairy conversion and subdivisions into lifestyle units (farming is not the primary
income) (MAF, 1997). Smaller forests and woodlots are found throughout the region, but
are more common in the central and eastern areas.
The site quality or suitability is defined by the site and basal area (Eyles, 1986).
The radiata pine site index of the Coastal Bay of Plenty exceeds 29m. Site indices
greater than 25m (20 year base) occur on 77% of North Island. (Eyles, 1986) Radiata
pine accounts for 90% of the planted timber resource with 5% in Douglas fir. The Bay of
Plenty plantation forests represent 40% of New Zealand's exotic forests (MoF, 1993).
The Bay of Plenty region includes the Port of Tauranga which serves the entire
Central North Island region and is the principal port handling almost 70 % of the nations
forestry exports. The region's processing plants include two large kraft pulp and paper
mills, one large and one small chemical thermo-mechanical pulp mill, 35 sawmills, two
veneer plants, four post and pole manufacturers and one combined particle board and
medium density fibreboard plant (MoF, 1993). The Coastal Bay of Plenty has an
extensive network of national and provincial highways and urban and rural roads.
There is national transport network of railfi-eight servicing the forestry sector (MoF,
1993).
The Wairarapa region is on the southern coast of the North Island. There are
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approximately 680 farms in the Wairarapa region (MAF, 1997). The region is prone to
dry summer periods with relatively low annual rainfall (MAF, 1997). On the coast,
Wairarapa soils generally have low fertility, but respond well to fertilizers yielding
productive pastoral land use. The hilly lands are prone to erosion and severe gully
erosion has been controlled by planting trees (MoF, 1993). The site index of the
Wairarapa ranges between 25 and 29m (20 yr base).

Radiata pine dominates new

plantings.
Pulp, post and pole production and sawmilling are the primary wood processing
industries on the southern North Island. Although there are no export fecilities in the
region, a chip miU at Masterson supplies chips from low-grade logs for the Pan Pacific
pulp mill near Napier. Transportation systems are limited. Projections for the year 2000
suggest that forest products will represent 25% to 30% of the port of Wellington's total
exports (MoF, 1993).
There are approximately 460 owner/operator sheep and beef properties in the
Taranaki district. (MAF, 1997).

The region is characterized by a summer-wet climate

and a mix of rolling to steep hills with some good flats. Soils are productive and variable.
Radiata pine site index exceeds 29m on the southwest coast and ranges between 25 and
29m (20 yr base) on the remainder of the landscape (Eyles, 1986).
A good network of roads connects the Taranaki Region. However, the Pararapa
road limits the carrying capacity of the region. The Westgate Taranaki Port of New
Plymouth is on the West Coast of the North Island and in the Taranaki Region. The total
cubic metre of logs exported each year continues to rise while the export of other forest
products are negligible (MoF, 1993).

Farm Types
Four alternative investment structures for landowners and outside investors are
illustrated through the following studies. Farm A is a 245 ha farm in the eastern Bay of
Plenty. The owners have independently fvmded the 53 ha of radiata pine plantations they
have established and managed on their farm for 27 years.

Farm B is a 152 ha farm in the

eastern Bay of Plenty. Twenty-five partners employ a property manager to buy, plant and
manage the property as an investment. They have planted 112 ha and leased the remaining
40 ha out for grazing rights and separately as a homestead. Farm C is a 5891 ha hill
country sheep and beef station entirely investor owned evaluated as an integrated forestry,
livestock, and tourism venture. The investors and owners have proposed to plant 2200
hectares with radiata pine, 1473 ha of native bush preserved for its environmental,
commercial and recreational potential, and the remaining 2218 ha leased to a farmer for
grazing and homesteading. Farm D, Farm E and Farm F are all owned by farmers who
have opted to seek outside investors and form a Joint Venture under the Forestry Rights
Registration Act. Although each Joint Venture is tailored to suit the needs of both parties,
the landowner contributions are usually the use of the land, and the fixed costs of the farm.
The investor's contribution is finance for forest development and management, labor and
equipment required for planting, managing and harvesting.

Silvicultural Model
Yield tables were modeled using version 6.0 of STANDPAK a decision support
system for radiata pine and Douglas-fir (Pseudotsuga menziesii) in New Zealand. (FRI,
1995). STANDPAK predicts the volume and grades for logs or saw timber, and can be
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used to evaluate land use options at a stand level (Whiteside, 1989). STANDPAK allows
the user to schedule silviculture and generate single hectare yield tables based on the site
index, silviculture and market inputs.

The single hectare yield tables from STANDPAK

were used to assess the agroforestry projects at an estate level. The agroforestry projects
were modeled using version 3.0 of the Agroforestry Estate Model (AEM) (Knowles and
Middlemiss, 1991), a decision support system designed to show the effects of a sustained
planting and felling program on a farm's financial flows. Agroforestry is evaluated by the
model at both the project and whole farm level (Knowles and Middlemiss, 1991). AEM
allows the evaluation of a wide range of scenarios and options and traces the physical and
financial flows through time. AEM was run for each site to analyze the cumulative affects
of multiple plantings was created for each site and then a separate run was created to
evaluate each joint venture as independent project separate from the whole farm. For the
purpose of the comparative evaluations, input assumptions were made for both
STANDPAK and AEM. The management and financial assumptions that remain constant
for all farms will be described here and the farm specific assumptions will be outlined on a
farm by farm basis.

Input Assumptions
To generate yield tables, STANDPAK requires estimates of stand parameters and
starting values (Maclaren, 1993). While some of these were predicted by the model, the
mean topheight, basal area and mean diameter at breast height were specific inputs derived
from regional plot data or from the farm itself While STANDPAK required a
quantitative basal area input, the early growth model requires the user to define the basal
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area as low, medium, or high. High basal areas are usually found on land with over
1000mm of annual rainfall and where the growth of nitrogen fixing clovers has been
encouraged by phosphate and intensive grazing. Medium basal area is associated with
land were sufficient fertilizer has been applied to counteract the soil nutrient deficiencies
(West at al, 1987). The site index for each site was derived fi*om Eyles (1986). For ease
of analysis, a single site index was chosen for each plantation site. However, there are
variations of site index over farms as well as within paddocks. Depending on the
microclimactic conditions, bottom slope site indices can vary by more than 6 m compared
with hilltops (Jarvis et al., 1989). The implications of this variation will be discussed later.
A target DOS (diameter over stubs) of 17.0 cm was set in STANDPAK and the model
automatically designed a silvicultural regime based on this target. Rotations were limited
to 28 years which is within typical ranges for radiata pine recommended by Maclaren
(1993).
AEM requires a set of inputs specific to the site being evaluated. To build a
project in AEM, the user must enter the farm accounts, define the crop type, define the
planting and felling program, and apply the crop type to the planting areas. To build a
crop type, the user creates a labor table, a costs table, an imderstory table, and a yield
table. The STANDPAK yield tables were in^orted directly into the AEM software. The
labor table for the silvicultural operation costs were calculated using the New Zealand
Forest Service estimates. This data was applied to the labor rates and used to generate a
labor table. Unless stated otherwise, log prices were derived from the New Zealand Farm
Forestry Association (1997). Supervision costs of 15% were assimied. The costs table
included the costs of plantation establishment and management not included in the labor
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table. The farm account numbers were taken from the model sheep and beef ferms, as
described in the MAP Farm Monitoring Reports. The statistics have been modified to
accurately represent the size and livestock unit (Isu) carrying capacity of each farm site.
An assumption of this analysis was that the financial returns per hectare of land were
optimized with a management regime which produced high value clearwood logs while
maintaining grazing where it was deemed appropriate. The division of the project costs
and revenues between the landowner and investor are summarized on a farm by farm
basis.

Investment Model
Internal Rates of Return (IRR) and Net Present Values (NPV) were used for the
economic analysis. One of the most controversial analysis inputs is the choice of an
appropriate discount rate. Usually a discount rate is chosen to reflect the forgone rates of
return on the marginal project displaced by the investment option or the opportimity cost
of the capital being used over time. Because the choice of an appropriate discount rate
can be controversial and depends largely on the subtleties of the circumstances, this study
recognizes the limitations to selecting a discount rate that accurately reflects all of the
market variables and individual preferences and choices.
For example, the New Zealand treasury insists on a 10% discount rate for projects
receiving government support (Jarvis and Perley, 1989). Major forest companies regard
7% as an acceptable rate for forestry investments (Jarvis and Perley, 1989). In the United
States, the USDA Forest Service uses a discount rate of 4% for evaluating long-term
investments in resource management (Jarvis and Perley, 1989). Subsequently, for the
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purpose of financial analysis, this study will look at the outcome over a range of discount
rates between 6 and 10 percent.

Farm Sites Methods and Assumptions
This study examines two farm sites in the Coastal Bay of Plenty. Both of these
illustrate two different forestry investment vehicles.
A is a sheep and beef farm funded by the owners.

The first farm forestry venture, Farm
Farm A is 56 km fi-om the port in

Tauranga. The livestock carrying capacity averages 2900 livestock units. The property is
comprised of 60% short steep hiUs and 40% broad valley bottoms or ridge crests. It has
several pockets of native bush and a stream running through the native forest and the
pasture. The predominant species in the valley bottoms are ryegrass and white clover
while the hill species are rice grass (Microlaena stipoides), summer grass {Digitaria
sanguinalis) and brown top (Agrostis tenuis). When Farm A was first established, the
Paengaroa hills and the light pumice soil derived fi-om Kaharoa and Taupo ash were prone
to erosion if disturbed.

Concern for their land and the poorly eroded soils led the

owners to apply agroforestry principles on their farm After observing the excellent tree
growth rates in their first paddock, they decided to expand their tree planting goals fi-om
erosion control to income diversity.
Planting started in 1970 and has averaged 2.6 ha per year (Knowles et al., 1991).
Their planting program proposes that they plant and fell a cumulative total of 314 ha over
100 years. The primary species planted is radiata pine, but they have also planted Cypress
(Cupressus lusitanica), Eucalypts (Eucalyptus saligna), Poplars (E botryoides), and
Walnuts (Acacia melanoxylon). Because the farm is owner fimded, the labor hours were
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family members rather than contract. The owner's experience is a benchmark in the
Coastal Bay of Plenty for owner funded diversification into agroforestry. Using the MAF
Farm Monitoring Report for the Coastal Bay of Plenty, this study looks at the
silvicutultural scenarios and evaluates the economic returns to a farmer who independently
fimds an agroforestry project.
For the STANDPAK analysis, the required plot data points were generated fi-om
Forest Research Institute plot data. The STANDPAK model NAPIRAD was used to
simulate the late growth model. NAPIRAD is based on the growth rates of207 plots east
of Bay of Plenty. A complete record of the STANDPAK growth model assimiptions and
the details of NAPIRAD are available in Appendix 1. The AEM input farm costs and
revenues are based on the MAF Model Farm for the Coastal Bay of Plenty. The total
farm size is 245 hectares, the project land value is NZ$4500/ha (.6US$ ~1NZ$) and the
total farm livestock unit (Isu) carrying capacity is 3060. Table 1 outlines the AEM inputs
for Farm A.

Table 1. Farm A AEM Input Assumptions.
Farm A: 270/300 sph final crop
Operation
hrs/ha/vr
Initial stocking plant 400 sph
5
Release Spray 400 sph
3.3
3.8 year old prune 250 sph to 2.2 m
9
4.0 year old thin to waste
4.8 year old prune 225 sph to 3.6 m
9
5.9 year old prune 225 sph to 5.2 m
11
7.2 year old prune 135 sph to 6.3 m
12
8.0 year prune remainder to 6.3m
3
2.5
Various stand ages thin to waste

costNZ$/hr NZ$/ha
20
100
20
60
20
180
25
25
20
180
20
220
20
240
20
60
25
62.5
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Farm A: 135 sph final crop
Operation
hrs/ha/yr
Initial stocking 150 sph
3
Release Spray 150 sph
1.65
4 year old prune 140 sph to 2.2m
6
4 year thin to 142 sph
1
5 year old prune 140 to 3.6 m
6
6 year old prune 135 sph to 5.2m
8
7 year old prune 75 sph to 6.3
7
7 year old thin to 135 sph
1
8.0 year prune remainder to 6.3
4

cost NZ$/hr
20
20
20
25
20
20
20
25
20 ,

Operation
Establishment

Farm A: Cost Table 135 sph
year start
year finish
1
1

NZ$/ha
100

Oneration
Establishment

Farm A; Cost Table 270 sph
year start
year finish
1
1

NZ$/ha
220

NZ$/ha
60
33
120
25
120
160
140
25
80

Farm A: Aggregation yield table m^ 270/300 sph
Log types
PR grade pruned domestic sawlog; min. small end diameter (s.e.d) 40 cm; length 3 to 6m
A grade Japan export: min. s.e.d.30 cm, length 12.1m
S3L3 domestic: min. s.e.d 16-25cm, length 3 to 6m
K grade Korean export: min. s.e.d.20, length 5.5 to 11.Im
Pulp domestic chip; length no min. s.e.d, length 3 to 8m
Age
28

Age
28

PR
248.30

A
93.10

S3L3
98.30

K
237.70

Mp
43.0

PR
174.90

Farm A: Aggregation yield table m^ 135 sph
A,
S3L3
K
Pulp
11.50
22.70
195.20
81.70

Log Prices NZ$(age 28) at the farm gate (stumpage value) per m^
Age PR
A
S3L3
K
Pulp
28
$125
$75
$50
$45 $10

Total
720.40

Total
486.0
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Harvesting Costs
Operation
Cartage $0.17 m3/km x 50km
Administration/Sales
Wharfage
Commission
Total

Crop Type NZ$/m^
$8.50
$3.50
$13.00
$5-$11
31.00

Farm B Partnership
The second Coastal Bay of Plenty property illustrates the partnership model as an
investment vehicle for agroforestry. Partnership B at Mystery Downs is 50km from the
Port of Taxiranga. In 1991, the partners purchased a 153.7 ha sheep and beef farm for
NZ$ 465,000. The laws limited the partners to 25 people and the project was divided
into 50 shares selling for NZ$ 12,000/share.

With the exception of the homestead and

the grazing lease on 41.7 ha, the purpose was to afforest the pasture with radiata pine in
three stages from 1992-1994. The initial surplus monies in addition to the annual income
from the homestead and grazing leases has provided enough money to cover the
establishment and preliminary management costs.

In 1994 the partnership purchased 7

ha of additional planted trees from the New Zealand government. With the exception of
three shares, the original partnership has remained intact and the September,1997 asking
share rate was NZ$30,000. Excluding the value of the planted trees, the current valuation
for the block is NZ$ 1,200,000. The Coastal Bay of Plenty has experienced an increase in
land value due to the demand for lifestyle blocks and the high returns on daily farms. This
study uses the Farm B partnership as an illustration of an investment vehicle for more than
one investor interested in purchasing a block of land and planting trees.
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STANDPAK calculated the projected values based on adjacent Paengaroa research
plots. The AEM input farm costs and revenues are based on the MAF Model Farm for the
Coastal Bay of Plenty.

Table 2. Farm B AEM Input Assumptions.

For the purpose of the study, the paddock stocking rates (400 and 670 sph) were averaged
to (535 sph) to create one labor table.
Operation
hrs/ha/yr
cost NZ$/hr NZ$/ha
Initial stocking 535 sph
5
100.00
20.00
4.8 year old pnme 400 sph to 2.5m
18
16.41
295.38
Thin to 450 sph
2
10.49
38.98
6.0 year old pnme 370 sph to 4.5m
17
16.41
278.97
Thin to 370 sph
77.96
4
19.49
8.0 year old prune 325 sph to 6.5m
18
295.38
16.41

Age
28

Farm B: Aggregation yield table m^
PR
A
K
S3L3 Pulp Total Waste
248.8 174.5 145.1 59.3 135.7 763.4 10.4
FarmB: Log Prices NZ$ per m^
PR
A
S3L3
$160
$126
$65

Age
28

Operation
Planting
Releasing
Prep

Farm B: Establishment Costs
year start
year finish
1
1
1
1
0
0

K
$96

Pulp
$42

cost NZ$/ha
$306
$89.80
$6.46

Farm B: Harvesting Costs
Operation
Crop Type NZ$/m^
Log and Load
18.00
Cartage
8.50
Roading (Arterial)
.76
Administration/Sales
5.00
Total
32.26
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FarmC
On the Eastern Wairarapa Coast is Farm C. This is a 100% single investor owned
property designed to maximize multiple uses and utilize the land in a way that is suited for
its different physical attributes, productive capacities, and resources for the land. Farm C
is an illustration of how miiltiple use forestry and private landscape design plays an
important role in farm land management.
Farm C is situated 65 km southeast of Masterton. The 1997 valuation was NZ$
5,075,000. The majority of the property receives an annual rainfall of approximately 950
mm per year with a tendency for a dry summer dry. The landscape is diverse with
potential for maximization of multiple use options. The farm is 25% native bush and 75%
pasture. The livestock carrying capacity is 30,000 Isu. The proposed land management
scheme involves planting the 2200 of the 2592 hectares of pasture and light scrub pockets
with radiata pine. The native bush pockets will remain intact and the planting will be
achieved paddock by paddock giving each planted area definable boundaries in the form of
existing fence lines.
For the STANDPAK analysis, the required plot data points were generated fi*om
adjacent New Zealand Forest Service Ngaumu Forest plots. The STANDPAK early
growth model crop type assiraiptions are NAPIRAD. The AEM farm costs were derived
fi-om the MAF Hawke's Bay - Wairarapa summer dry model farm reports.
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Table 3: Farm C ASM Input Assumptions.
FarmC: Operation
hrs/ha/vr
cost NZ$/hr
Initial Stocking 950 sph
15
18
Release 950 sph
3.5
18
6 yr prune 320 sph to 2.2 m
13
20
6 yr thin to 640 sph
6
25
8 yr prune 320 sph to 4.2 m
14
20
10 yr thin to 480 sph
6
25
10 yr prune 320 sph to 6.2m
18
20
Farm C: Aggregation yield table
Age PR
A
K
S3L3 Pulp TRV
28
190
59
124
151 131
655

Age
28

PR
$190

Farm C: Log Prices NZ$ m^
A
S3L3
$119
$71

K
$95

NZ$/ha
270
63
260
150
280
150
360

Pulp
$49

Farm C; Harvesting Costs
Operation
Crop Type NZ$/m3
Cartage $0.17 m3/kmx 140km
$19.57
Administration/Sales
$5.42
Log and Load
$19.82
Roading
$2.53
Total
$47.34

Taranaki Joint Ventvires - Methods and Assumptions
With the implementation of the Resource Management Act in 1991, regional
environmental jurisdictions have been divided by catchment boundaries. These
jurisdictions are (run) by regional councils. As a component of their informational
advocacy campaign, the Taranaki Regional Covmcil examines the land-use capabilities of
farm properties within the Council boundaries and suggests the best uses for each site on
the land. While plans are provided for landowners to promote voluntary change towards
sustainable land use practices, the long term goals are aimed at restoring the regions
ecosystems. AflForestation with radiata pine is the most widely recommended means for
restoring the eroded soils on the Taranaki hill country sites. To finance afforestation
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eflfoits, the council promotes joint ventures as a means to fimd forest establishment,
management and harvesting costs.
The purpose of joint ventures is the combining of land, capital and labor to make
the best use of those resources for the mutual benefit of all participating parties (Ministry
of Forestry, 1991). Under the Forestry Rights Registration Act 1983, Joint Ventures are
possible through the creation of a "profit a prendre." A profit a prende is defined as a
right to enter on the land of another and take therefi-om some part of its substance or
produce (MoF, 1991). The Act creates a "Forestry Rights" which is the formal
registration of rights using the Forest Rights Registration Act 1983. It is defined in the act
as a right granted by the grantor of any land to any other person to a) Establish, maintain
and harvest; or b) Maintain and harvest, a crop of trees on that land, together with c) Any
ancillary rights of access and of constructing and using such tracks, culverts, bridges,
buildings and other works and facilities as may be necessary to establish, maintain, and
harvest, or as the case may be, to maintain and harvest the crop: and d) Any provisions for
charges, payments, royalties, or division of the crop or the proceeds of the group, whether
or not such rights or provisions are coupled with an obligation; but no such right shall be
capable of conferring a right of exclusive possession of that land. (Forestry Rights
Registration Act, 1983).
A forestry right is created by registering a joint venture agreement against the title
of land with the District Land Register under the Land Transfer Act 1952 (MoF, 1994).
The report of the Forestry Joint Venture Working Group identified three different types of
joint venture relationships. First, the bringing together of individual or corporate investors
for the purpose of an investment in forestry (MoF, 1991). Second, the bringing together
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of investors and land owners for the purpose of forestry enterprise (MoF, 1991). Third,
the coming together of forest owners for the purpose of managing the forest for their
mutual benefit (MoF, 1991).
Conceptually, in a forestry joint venture, a landowner invites an investor to
contribute the capital to work on the landowners land and each would derive a share of
the returns commensurate with the worth of each partner's inputs (MoF, 1991). The
distribution of revenue from a Forestry Right for grantor and grantee should reflect the
earnings rate of the project and the relative inputs by landowner and grantee investor. For
example, high value land which can be planted inejqiensively should earn more for the
landowner than inexpensive land with high costs of clearing and planting at equal distance
from the point of sale of forest produce (MoF, 1991). There are a wide range of input and
revenue distribution arrangements a landowner and investor can take. Consequently,
while the joint ventvire is uniform is concept, each registered forestry right is a highly
tailored agreement designed specifically to meet the needs of both parties involved.
Farm D is an 840 ha sheep and beef farm in Makahu. The owners have two joint
ventures on their land and have planted a total of 94 out of the 840 hectares in radiata pine
trees. The farm is 43 km east of Stratford and 86km from New Plymouth. It's on the
periphery of Taranaki's pastoral land base and is adjacent to an area of indigenous forest
(the Matemateaonga Range.) The farm is characterized by a small area of flat to rolling
terrain, but the majority is steep hills. The farm experiences a temperate climate with an
evenly distributed armual rainfaU of 1900 mm. The farm is 73% pasture, 14% indigenous
forest or scrub, 11% exotic and 2% residential and farm buildings and unavailable areas.
The property winters approximately 5000 Isus (70% sheep and 30% cattle).
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For the STANDPAK analysis, the required plot data points were generated from
adjacent property Forest Research Institute plot data. STANDPAK calc;ilated the
projected values based on FRI known starting values. The STANDPAK model 22
PPM88 was used to simulate the late growth model. The AEM input ferm
costs and revenues are based on the MAF Model Farm for the Taranaki Region.

Table 4: Farm D AEM Input Assumptions.
Operation
Initial Stocking 833 sph
Release 833 sph
4 yr prune 350 sph to 2.2 m
5 yr thin to 500 sph
6 yr prune 325 sph to 4.2 m
7 yr thin to 325 sph
8 yr prune 320 sph to 6.2m
11 yr. Dothistroma Spray

Operation
Establishment
Herbicide
Repairs and Maintenance
Weeds/Pest
Accoimts/audit

Farm D: Establishment Costs
start vr.
1
1
1
1
1

cost NZ$/hr
20
20
20
25
20
25
20
20

finish yr.
1
1
28
28
28

NZ$/ha
220
170
450
132.5
520
265
600
35

NZ$/ha
175
30
5
2
6

Farm D: Log aggregation yield table:m
S3L3 Pulp Total Waste
PR
A
K
217.3 90.9 120.3 52.6 126.8 608.1 7.9

Aee
28

Age
28

hrs/ha/vr
11
8.5
22.5
5.3
26
10.6
30
1.75

PR
$192

Farm D: Log Prices $NZ m^
S3L3
A
$57
$80.62

K
$67.17

Pulp
$37
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Harvesting Costs Operation
Cartage $0.17 m^/kmx 93kni
Administration/Sales
Total

Crop Type NZ$/m3
$15.81
$ .20
$16.11

A joint venture scenario was evaluated for the plantations on Farm E. This
involved an AEM run for each planting (57ha in 1993) and (37ha in 1994). The division
of the project costs and grazing revenues between the landowner and the investor are
summarized in Table 5.

Table 5. Farm D Joint Venture Revenues and Costs Distributions.
Revenues

Landowner %

Investor %

Understorey revenues before planting
Understorey revenues after planting

100%
100%

0%
0%

Costs
Silviculture costs
Supervision of silvicultvire
Incidental costs
Establishment costs
Re-establishment
Fixed costs
Land cost

Landowner%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
100%

Investor%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
0%
0%

The joint venture was evaluated over a 28-year period. The joint venture cash flows were
calculated by AEM at discount rates from 6% to 10% at 2% intervals.
Farm E is 250 ha, 13 km east of Hawera and 73km from New Plymouth. It's on
the periphery of Taranaki's pastoral land and is adjacent to the Tarere Forest. The farm is
characterized by a small area of flat to rolling terrain, but the majority is steep hills. The
lithology is volcanic ash overlaying Tertiary sedimentary silty sandstone and the soils are
free draining yellow-brown loams (MoF, 1993). The farm experiences a temperate
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climate with an feirly evenly distributed annual rainfall of about 1800 mm. The farm is
20% pasture, 13% indigenous forest or scrub, 65% exotic forest and 2% residential and
farm buildings and unavailable areas. Most of the flats are leased out to a dairy farmer
down the road and the owner continues to graze sheep in the hilk amidst the forests and a
few heifers on the flat. The property summers approximately 1030 livestock units (80%
sheep and 20% cattle).
For the STANDPAK analysis, the required plot data points were generated from
New Zealand Forest Research Institute plot data from a property in the region. The
STANDPAK model PPM88 was used to simulate the late growth model. The AEM input
farm costs and revenues are based on the MAF Model Farm for the Taranaki Region.
Farm E has three joint ventures on the land and has planted 163 out of250 ha
(65%) in radiata pine. Joint Venture 1 was established in 1991 and contains 110 ha or
44% or his total land. Joint Venture 2 was established in 1994 and contains 25 hectares or
10% of his total land.

Joint Venture 3 was established in 1997 and is also a 25 ha block.

Because the distribution of final revenues vary depending on the contribution of inputs,
each of the landowner's joint ventures has been specifically tailored to reflect the costs
associated with the individual forestry block. Specifically, Joint Venture 1 has a 40%
landowner, 60% investor split while Joint Venture 2 45% landowner, 55% investor split.
Joint Venture 3 was still negotiating the terms of the distribution. A forest manager was
hired to do the plantings and silviculture, but the landowner maintains careful stewardship
over the trees. Goats, possums and hare pose a threat to young trees and the landowner
spent five hours a day for three months shooting goats in 1997.
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Table 6: Farm E AEM Input Assumptions.
Farm E 920/1000 sph:
Operation
Initial Stocking 960 sph
Release 960 sph
2nd Release 960 sph
5 yr prune 320 sph to 2.2 m
6 yr prune 320 sph to 4.2 m
8 yr thin to 480 sph
8 yr prune 320 sph to 6.2m
8 yr. Dothistroma Spray
11 yr. Dothistroma Spray

JV 1 (1997) JV2 (1994)
hrs/ha/yr
costNZ$/ha
11
20
8.5
20
1.75
20
22.5
20
26
20
10.6
25
30
20
1.75
20
1.75
20

NZ$/ha
220
170
35
450
520
265
600
35
35

JV 1997 1 Costs Table
Start (vr)
Finish (vr)
1
1
1
28
1
28
1
28
1
28
1
28

Cost (NZS/ha/vr)
190
2
13.5
5
2
6

JV 1994 Costs Table
Operation
Start (vr)
Finish (yr')
Establishment
1
1
Rates
1
28
Fire protection
1
28
Repairs and Maintenance 1
28
Weed/pest control
1
28
Accounts/audit
1
28

Cost (NZ$/ha/vr)
190
20.7
2
5
2
6

Operation
Establishment
Fire protection
Rates
Repairs and Maint.
Weed/pest control
Accounts/audit

FarmE; JV 3 1991 600 sph
hrs/ha/vr
Operation
Initial Stocking 600 sph
9.3
Release 600 sph
13.9
4 yr prune xx sph to 2.2 m
11.3
7 yr prune xx sph to 4.2 m
11.3
5.5
10 yr thin to 320 sph
12.5
10 yr prune 320 sph to 6.2m

NZ$/hr
20
20
20
20
25
20

NZ$/ha
186
278
226
226
137.5
250
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Operation
Establishment
Fire Insurance
Management
Roading
Administration
Setup and legal

Cost rNZ$/ha/vr')
190
286
269
182
127
9

Fanii E; Log Aggregation Yield Table
PR
A
K
S3L3 Pulp TRY Waste
212.8 148 104.8 62.4 110.8 638.9
8.6

Age
28

Age
28

FarmE: JV 1991 Costs Table
Start fvr')
Finish fvr>
1
1
8
28
1
28
27
28
28
1
1
28

PR
$188

Farm E: Log Prices $NZ m
A
S3L3
$119
$71

Farm E: Harvesting Costs
Cartage $0.17 m3/km x 73km
Administration/Sales
Log and Load
Roading (covered in costs table)
Total

K
$95

Pulp
$49

Crop Type NZ$/m^
$12.41
$5.00
$13.00
$0.76
$31.17

A joint venture scenario was evaluated for the plantations on Farm E. This
involved an AEM run for each planting (JV 1 1 lOha in 1991) and (JV NPDC2 25ha in
1994) and (NPDCl 25ha in 1997). The division of the project costs and grazing revenues
between the landowner and the investor are summarized in Table 7.
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Table 7. Farm E Joint Venture Revenues and Costs Distributions.
Revenues
Landowner
Understory revenues before planting
100%
Understory revenues after planting
100%

Investor
0%
0%

Costs
Silviculture costs
Supervision of silviculture
Incidental costs
Materials costs
Establishment Costs
Fixed costs
Land cost

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
100%

Farm F is 105.8 km from New Plymouth. The total property area is 242.8 ha with
a proposed 186.7 hectare joint venture. It's in the heart of Taranaki's pastoral hill country
land. The farm is characterized by a small area of valley flats rising into moderately steep
to steep country with areas of bare rock and ejqjosed bluffs. The farm experiences a
ten^erate climate with an fairly evenly distributed annual rainfall of about 1800 mm to
2000mm. The farm is 6% pasture, 20% indigenous forest, 73% exotic forest, and less
than 1% residential and farm buildings and unavailable areas. The major vegetation is
regenerating Manuka scrub extending into the native bush. The property was purchased
as a lifestyle block (farming is not their primary income), but it winters 400 Isu.

Table 8. Farm F AEM Input Assumptions.
Operation
Pre-plant spray
Plant 833 sph
Release
Prune 350 sph to 2.2m
Prune 325 sph to 4.5
Thin to 600 sph
Prune 300 sph to 6.5
Thin to 300 sph

Year
0
1
1
2
4
4
6
7

Hours/ha/vr
2.0
4.7
2.0
7.0
14.0
5.3
17.3
7.2

Costs nSfZS/hr)
20
20
20
20
20
25
20
25
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Farm F; Costs Table
Start (vr^
Finish (vr)
1
1
1
1
1
28

Operation
Establishment
Fencing
Management

Age
28

Age
28

Cost (NZS/ha/vr")
166.00
111.57
127.00

Farm F; Log aggregation yield table m^
PR
A
K
S3L3 Pulp Total Waste
212.8 148 104.8 62.4 110.8 638.9 8.6
Farm F; Log Prices (NZ$) m^
m
A
S3L3
$188
$119
$71

K
$95

Pujp
$49

Farm F: Harvesting Costs
Operation
Crop Type NZ$/ m^
Cartage $0.17 ni3/kmx 105km
$18.00
Administration/Sales
$5.00
Log and Load
$4.00
Roading
$2.00
Total
$30.00

A joint venture scenario was evaluated for the plantations on Farm F. This
involved an AEM run for each planting (186ha). The division of the project costs and
grazing revenues between the landowner and the investor are siraimarized in Table 9.
Table 9. Farm F Joint Venture Revenues and Costs Distributions.
Revenues
Understorey revenues before planting
Understorey revenues after planting

Landowner %
100%
100%

Investor %
0%
0%

Costs
Silviculture costs
Supervision of silviculture
Incidental costs
Establishment costs
Re-establishment costs
Fixed costs
Land cost

Landowner%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
100%

Investor%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
0%
0%
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RESULTS
Cash flows
AEM output sheets show the cash flows on the agroforestry project and the whole
farm cash flows in 1997 dollars with no discoimting.

For example, the cash flows on the

agroforestry project reflects the revenue and expenditure on a per ha basis of the
agroforestry project, not the whole farm. AEM output sheets show cash flows on the
agroforestry projects as a marginal investment as well. (For this analysis, individvial
planted areas on a single farm were evaluated as one project.)

Table 10. Cumulative Cash Flows on All Farms.

Farm Size/ ha
Project Size/ ha
Project Length/ yrs
Forestry Project as a
Marginal Investment
W/O Forestry/ $NZ ha
Cash Flows on
Forestry Project/ $NZ ha
W/O Forestry/ $NZ ha
Cash Flows on
Total Farm/ $NZ ha
W/O Forestry/ $NZ ha

Farm A
275
314.1
100

Farm B
152
112
32

Farm C
5891
2200
35

Farm D
840
84
33

Farm E
250
160
35

Farm F
243
186
30

33133.84
3794.45

55841.11
-3041.68

13189
931.29

6667.21
1109.22

36046.81
3314.87

40727.43
1582.45

36845.38
8033.69

59969.11
0

37232.8
1646.92

6998.86
1440.86

36749.19
4017.25

41058.02
1913.04

48195.06
20997.09

45059.77
-4128

36338.71
1313.02

12514.4
6956.4

34679.9
1947.96

40086.18
941.23

Net Present Value
A change in land use will lead to a change in farm NPV. The NPV is sensitive to
both the discoimt rate and the number of years that contribute to the valuation. Table 11
shows the whole farms NPV for discount rates ranging from 6-10. The change in NPV
(or the effect of the project) is a comparison between the farms NPV with and without
forestry. While AEM outputs sheets present values with both contract and own labor, the
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summary tables assume contract labor (as if someone was paid to do the work and
supervision) is used.

Table 11. NPV for Whole Farm Over a Range of Discount Rates.
DR = Discount Rate; NPV = of total farm per project hectare
EOP = Effect of the project on farm NPV contract labor per hectare
FamiA
Farm A FarmB
FamB
e NPVSNZ BOPSNZ NFV®C ECP$NZ
6
-58.94
874.4 4543.44 6708.22
8
-830.69
262.94 1255.35 4475.97
10
-1136.7
5258
577.46 2555.31
FarmC
FarmC
FarmD FamiD
NFV
EOP
NPV
ECP
6 1101.52 109268
970.36
501.48
8
189.25
284.8
459.24
85.44
10
-27Z01
-107.81
175.31
-129.95
FamiE
FarmE
FarmF
FarmF
NPV
EOP
NPV
ECF
6 5266.81 449267 5661.51 5297.58
8 2459.31 1999.86 2476.27 2279.07
10
878.5
633.22
296.18
626.88

Table 12 shows the IRR and the NPV for the project with three different options.
The figures include the costs of land and fixed costs at the start of the project. The cash
flows used to derive the IRR are shown in Cumulative Cash Flows on All Farms (Table
10).
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Table 12. IRR and NPV for All Farms.
Farm A
6.15%

Farm B
9.94%

Farm C
10.23%

Farm D
16.25%

Farm E

14.4%

Farm F
13.04%

Marginallnvestment
IRR Contract Labor

5.91%

9.24%

8.66%

12.00%

11.95%

11.32%

Marginallnvestment
IRR No forestry

2.43%

0%

6.14%

20.00%

13.64%

11.92%

Marginallnvestment
IRR Own Labor

Cash Flows
Whole farm cash flow in five year increments for the three farm sites with joint
ventures is provided in Table 13. The cash flows were evaluated for the agroforestry
projects assuming the farmer provides the financing. If an investor covers the
establishment and silviculture costs, the cash flows would be different, generally more
stable over time and subject only to the variable cash flows of a traditional working farm
without forestry.

Table 13. Cash Flows for Whole Farm with Farmer Financing Forestry Project.
Farm D
Farm E
Farm F
($NZ)/ha
($NZ)/ha
($NZ)/ha
Year
-645.87
-1050.02
855.13
1-5
-1149.19
774.13
-565.37
6-10
-416.9
-539.61
955.36
11-15
-641.64
893.95
-226.41
16-20
-648.02
-294.01
21-25
882.33
44114.69
25149.02
3667.5
26-30
11679.44
n/a
31-35
4486
40086.21
34679.9
Cumulative
12514.4

Forestry profitability is determined by the wood values at the harvest and the real
opportunity cost of the cash capital to the landowner and investors. For a landowner, the
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opportunity cost can be defined as the forgone grazing revenue. For an investor, the
opportvinity costs is simply the value of any forgone investment opportunity. While the
opportunity costs to an investor cannot generally be quantified, the forgone grazing
revenue, substantially affects the cash flows on the whole farm. Assuming logging sales
revenues remain constant, the forgone grazing revenue is the primary opportunity cost for
the landowner to consider. The effect of the forgone grazing revenue is linked to the
proportion of the farm included in the forestry project and the total area as well the
stocking rates per hectare. Profitability of forestry and cash flows on the whole farm are
shown in Table 14.

Table 14. Logging Sales, Grazing Revenue Forgone and Cash Flows for farms A-F.
Total Cumulative
Total Cumulative
Total Cumulative
Cash Flows
Project
Project
Grazing Revenue
Logging Sales
Cash Flow
Forestry Project
Length/ yrs Size/ ha Forgone $NZ/ha
Revenue $NZ/ha
Fwestry Project $NZ/ha
$NZ/ Project ha
36845.38
42084.12
41156.15
100
314.1
5315.65
56285.15
41473.27
60876.94
32
112
0
37232.8
13904.63
26761.87
2200
11582
35
69988.55
6998.86
8174.17
84
1098
33
57420.6
36749.19
49557.76
160
2669
35
53640.32
41058.02
59270.47
1420
30
186

Farm Site
Farm A
FarmB
FarmC
FarmD
FarmE
FarmF

* Total cumulative revenues are divided by becatares comprising total &rm, not hectares comprising project.

The timing of the cash flow fluctuations is critical to farmers' ability to sustain
their farm. The total farm cash flows reflect the variability in the forgone grazing
revenues.

Table 15 shows this trend.
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Table 15. Farm D and Farm F Grazing Revenue
Foi^one and Whole Farm Cash Flow.

Year
1-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-25

Farm D Grazing Total Farm Farm F Grazing Total Farm
Revalue Fwgone Cash Flow Revenue Fra-gwie Cash Flow
perfermha/$NZ perha/$NZ po-fermha/SNZ perha/$NZ
166.01
855.13
212.56
-1050.02
774.13
1102
-1149.19
110.53
154.87
955.36
-539.61
210.43
220.77
893.95
312.46
-641.64
232.4
882.33
318.84
-648.02

Joint Venture Cost and Revenue Distributions
In a forestry joint venture, both parties have entered into a long term agreement
accepting, but not specifically determining, the risks and returns of establishing a forest.
As a result, the landowner allows the investor to put capital to work on the landowner's
land. Each party derives a share of the returns that represents the worth of each of
partner's input.

The revenue fi-om a Forestry Right should represent the earnings rate of

the project, the relative inputs by landowner and investors, and if the landowner prefers to
take annual rent rather than participate in the risk of the growing phase taken by the
investor. For the purposes of this study, the project land costs (the recognized value as a
purchase price not the income forgone by not grazing) and the fixed costs (defined as the
costs which remain the same, regardless of whether the land is used for farming or
agroforestry) have been attributed to the land owner. The investor pays the material,
silviculture, and extra incidental costs associated with the trees. The revenues are
distributed at the time of harvest and are apportioned based on the percent of the cost
inputs. The actual land value (as a percentage of the projects total direct costs) are
shown for each joint venture in Table 16.
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Table 16. Land Value as a Percent of the Total Project Costs. All values $NZ.
Farm Site
Project Size
Land Value
T1 Direct
Costs/ha
Land Value
as % of TDC

Farm D
37 ha
$643 ha

Farm D
57 ha
$643 ha

Farm E
110 ha
$1235 ha

Farm E
'97 25 ha
$1235 ha

Farm E
'94 25 ha
$1235 ha

FarmF
186 ha
$650ha

$3320

$3320

$2575

$3667

$3869

$5273

19.4%

19.4%

47.9%

33.7%

31.9%

12.3%

*Total direct costs include labor costs (silviculture x hourly rate); contract supervision;
other costs (fixed, variable and incidental); plant materials and establishments as well as
the re-establishment column.

The shared forestry revenues have been adjusted to reflect the grazing revenue the
farm receives fi"om the livestock grazing imder the trees. Based on the landowner
covering 100% of the land costs and 100% of the fixed costs, Table 17 shows the non
discounted forestry shared costs and revenue distributions. Per hectare costs and
revenues are based on the project hectares not the total farm hectares.

Table 17. Non Discounted Forestry Costs and Revenues Distribution for Farms D-F.
Land Value
% of TDC
Farm
Farm D 57 ha
Farm D 37 ha
Farm E 1991
Farm E 1994
Farm E 1997
Farm F

19.4
19.4
47.9
31.9
33.7
12.3

Costs/ha
Landowner
$NZ/%
4321.81/51.4
4321.81/51.4
2144.33/45.4
2269.76/37
2175.68/37.2
1081.90/17

Costs/ha
Investor
$NZ/%
3320.38/48.6
3320.38/48.6
2575.96/54.6
3869.08/63
3667.48/62.8
5273.95/83

Revenues/ha
Landowner
$NZ/%
31,112.30/49.2
31112.3 /49.2
24895.13/43.3
19388.36/33.7
19884/34.6
8844.85/15.2

Revenues/ha
Investor
$NZ/%
32140.23/50.8
32140.23/50.8
32627.47/56.7
38134.24/66.3
37638.64/65.4
49425.15/84.8
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Table 18. Discounted Forestry Cost and Revenue Distribution for Farms D-F.
Farm and
Discount Rate
Farm D37 &57
6
8
10
Farm E 1991
6
8
10
Farm E 1994
6
8
10
Farm E 1997
6
8
10
Farm F
6
8
10

Land Value
% of TDC

Costs/ha
Landowner
$NZ/%

Costs/ha
Investor
$NZ/%

Revenues/ha
Landowner
$NZ/%

Revenues/ha
Investor
$NZ/%

2037.88/45.7
1805.35/44.9
1634.33/44.6

2417.14/54.3
2209.25/55.0
2032.00/55.4

4488.44/38.5
2314.00/34.1
1131.61/28.4

7185.25/61.6
4474.74/65.9
2855.79/71.6

1686.72/48.7
1612.87/49.7
1558.17/50.7

1777.14/51.3
1630.96/50.3
1515.28/49.3

5102.45/45.3
3041.84/45.6
1817.65/45.6

6150.71/54.7
3625.82/54.4
2171.15/54.4

1703.12/38.2
1622.24/39.0
1563.56/40.3

2751.36/61.8
2511.76/60.8
2311.96/59.7

3638.88/34.2
2027.76/34.0
1127.76/33.4

6995.36/65.8
3929.56/66.0
2245.24/66.6

1692.52/39.0
1616.24/40.0
1560.16/41.1

2649.04/61.0
2425.84/60.0
2238.24/58.9

3926.4/34.9
2334.56/35.0
1391.76/34.9

7326.76/65.1
4333.08/65.0
2597.04/65.0

860.06/22.2
825.04/23.4
799.29/25.72

3018.35/77.8
2618.019/76.0
2308.01/74.3

1979.49/18.4
1175.83/18.8
678.55/18.5

8774.63/81.6
5078.14/81.2
2994.76/81.5

19.4

47.9

31.9

33.7

12.3

When evaluating the profitability of a joint venture, the choice of an appropriate
discount rate is a critical decision. There is an inverse relationship between the discount
rate and the costs and revenues distribution. First, as the discoxmt rate increases the dollar
value of costs and revenues decreases, the NPV decreases, and the distribution of costs
and revenues between the landowner and investor shifts. Table 19 uses the figures fi-om
Farm D to illustrate the discount rates relationship to costs and revenues.

Table 19. Relationship Between Discount Rate and NPV.
Discount Rate Investor costs $NZ/ha Investor revenues $NZ/ha NPV ($NZ)
0
3320.38
32140.22 28819.84
4
2663.57
11739.51
9075.94
6
2417.14
7185.24
4768.1
8
2209.25
4474.73
2265.48
10
2032
2855.78
823.78
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The NPV is linked to the percent distributed to the landowner and the investor and
therefore both variables cannot be separated from each other. Subsequently the projects
can be designed to reflect the needs and resources of each party. If the land value and
fixed costs are used to determine the landowner distributions, when the discount rate
changes so do the relative distributions and consequently the NPVs. On the other hand, if
the distributions are fixed by a standard percent, the discount rate only affects the NPV.
Each of the joint ventures was evaluated based on a forestry cost and forestry revenue
distribution between landowner and investor of20/80, 30/70, 40/60 and 50/50. The
discounted proposed distributions are outlined in Figures 1-5.
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Fig. 1 Farm D 37 ha and 57 ha Joint Venture NPV per forestry project hectare over a
range of cost and revenue distributions to the landowner and investor at discount rates of
6,8, and 10%.
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Farm E '91 JV Investor Share Costs and Revenues
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Fig. 2. Farm E Joint Venture 1991 NPV per forestry project hectare over a range of cost
and revenue distributions to the landowner and investor at discount rates of 6,8, and 10%.
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Farm E '97 Landowner Share Costs and Revenues
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Farm E '97 JV Investor Share Costs and Revenues
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Fig. 3. Farm E Joint Venture 1997 NPV per forestry project hectare over a range of cost
and revenues distributions to the landowner and investor at discount rates of 6,8, and
10%.
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Farm E '94 JV Landowner Share Costs and Revenues
4000
3000
>

^

-•—6

2000

-•—8

1000

-A-10

0
-1000

Landowner Share (%)

Farm E '94 JV Investor Share Costs and Revenues

6000
5000
4000
w
>
Ph

•6

3000

•8

2000 -

•10

1000

0
-1000

-»e-

-m-

-m-

•se-

Investor Share (%)

Fig. 4. Farm E Joint Venture 1994 NPV per forestry project hectare over a range of cost
and revenues distributions to the landowner and investor at discount rates of 6,8, and
10%.
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Investor Share Costs and Revenue Distributions
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Fig. 5. Farm F Joint Venture 1994 NPV per forestry project hectare over a range of cost
and revenue distributions to the landowner and investor at discount rates of 6,8 and 10%.
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Table 20. Agroforestry Joint Venture Project. Estimated Internal Rates of Return
Assuming Landowner covers 100% Fixed Costs and 100% Land Value.

Farm D (37 ha)
Farm D (57 ha)
Farm E (110 ha)
Farm E ('94 25 ha)
Farm E ('97 25 ha)
FarmF

Estimated IRR
Investor
12.6
12.6
11.8
9.9
10.8
11-4

Estimated IRR
Landowner
10.4
10.4
11.2
9.2
12.5
9.0

DISCUSSION
Limitations of Decision Support Model
While AEM provides a good benchmark for evaluating forestry investments, there
are weaknesses to evaluating forestry investments with decision support models. First,
AEM deals v^dth quantitative averages without a qualitative inventory.

Second, while

there can be a complementary relationship between farming and forestry, good farm land
usually makes good forest land. Therefore, farmers who plant trees in a high cost, low
return farm areas report that their livestock numbers are not reduced despite what may be
calculated displacement (by trees) using models such as AEM (Perley, 1992). Third,
effective profitability varies widely with each microsite. There are differences with
efBciencies in individual paddocks not accounted for in AEM. AEM does not allow
inputting how different land uses perform within the farm, and how they can be planned to
complement each other. Fourth, decision-making relates to economics on a farm-level not
a stand-level and variability is considerable over time.

Stand -level finances cannot be

detached fi-om the economics of the whole farm and the farmers overall objectives,
management strategies and whole farm constraints (Perley, 1997). While AEM will
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produce a range of answers depending on the variables applied to the cash flow analysis, it
does not adequately account for resources (ie reducing weed costs, reducing capital
depreciation associated with soil erosion, providing a riparian buffer for runoflF, or
happiness and satisfaction of the families) not included in the ferm accounts (Perley,
1997). In conclusion, ferm management may be more art than science and the best
decisions may not be made with spreadsheets and financial numbers. While, this study
applies quantitative data, it is imperative to recognize that the financial rationale is not
limited to a quantitative decision support model that generates impressive numbers. The
best decisions combine scientific data with artistic intuition, mindfiil reflection, and
qualitative evolution.

Effects on Cash Flows
The results suggest that introducing trees into a pure grazing farming system has
two major effects on farmers' cash flows. First, the reduced livestock rates over time
result in a short term loss of farm income. Second, forestry costs are incurred in the shortterm with a significant amount of income being received at the end of the rotation.
Therefore, while the long term benefits of planting trees have the potential to exceed a
traditional farming system, the farmer needs enough cash to remain solvent during the
period of lost grazing revenue to the forestry revenue. Consequently, the real cost to the
farmer of establishing forestry on developed grazing land is the opportunity costs of the
lost grazing revenue which occurs after establishing trees. The farm overhead costs will
remain similar (Jarvis et al, 1989).

In addition, the main determinants of forestry

profitability are the wood values at the harvest period and the real opportunity costs of the
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cash capital to the investors. Each of these factors incorporates risk and certainty. The
feasibility of an agroforestry project can be ascertained by closely examining and assessing
the net cash flow.

While assumptions can be made and trends analyzed, the certainty of

projected cash flow is limited in AEM because of these models assumptions.
An agroforestry venture needs to be evaluated as a freestanding venture as well as
being integrated into the profitability of the whole farm. For the purpose of this study,
analysis assumed all silvicultural operations were done by contract labor. All of the farms
showed an increase in cumulative cash flow when trees were planted. The cash flows on
the forestry investment were between 4 and 22 times greater than the cash flows without
forestry. However, while the landowner will increase their cumulative cash flow for the
whole farm if they fimd the forestry investment alone, the IRR is not as high as farming
alone.

Moreover, the year by year analysis each alternative illustrates the project effect

on the cash flows for the farm. The timing of the cash flows are just as important as the
net cash flows and for many landowner determine their land use. While wool and meat
prices may fluctuate over time and be a high risk in the short term, waiting for large
returns over a 28 year forestry rotation is not an option for many farmers. As an
alternative, an investor will reduce the cumulative returns from forestry to the landowner,
but they will cover the costs that may make the project impossible for a landowner to do
on their own.
The IRR is defined as the discoimt rate where the discounted costs and revenues
equal 0. It is also the interest rate in real terms that the user would expect to obtain from
the investment. Therefore, the real return is the discount rate at which an investor would
be indifferent to the choice between continuation of the grazing regime and agroforestry
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since the agroforestry regime would earn (at this discount rate) no more and no less than
the expected returns for continuing a farming system under pure grazing.
AEM calculates the non discoimted NPV and IRR without separating the project
area from the whole area at any time during the life of the project. However, the
profitability of the various agroforestry options was compared with and without ferming in
terms of IRR and NPV. Because the fixed costs are constant and applicable to all options,
the figures are expressed as marginal costs and revenues. The IRR on the marginal
investment returns using contract labor for forestry exceeded the IRR without forestry for
Farms A and C (Table 12). The IRR decreased slightly for Farms E and F. Farm D
showed the most dramatic results with the IRR decreasing by 8.0% when trees were
planted. The results suggest that planting trees affected the IRR most dramatically when
less than 50% of land was converted and significant grazing continues on the unplanted
area. When less than 5% of the land is converted the costs of forestry outweigh the
revenues and IRR decreased as a result. This indicates the landowner should probably not
convert any hectares to forestry unless an investor is financing the project. The IRR was
largely imaflfected when the total converted land exceeded 50% and minimal grazing
occured on the unplanted areas. When the rates of return are quite close, the landowner
should assess the risk and certainty of each investment. If they are financing the project
themselves, the landowner should choose the alternative with the least risk over a
specified period of time.
Overall, because the planting and felling occurs in a few sizeable blocks, the cash
flow is feirly constant except for periods with heavy costs of establishment (ejq^ressed as
forgone livstock revenue), silviculture, or revenues from harvest. If the landowner is
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fimding the forestry venture, capital would be invested as the farm accounts needed it over
the length of the project. The investor would invest when the project demands required
it. As a result, the minimum and maximum cash flows will be moderate reflecting the
forgone grazing revenue and the silvilculture labor costs.
If planting is staggered in small increments over many years the cash flow will
become constant. For example. Farm A has achieved a state where plantings and harvests
reached a constant level. Consequently, after 38 years, the cash flows are constant. An
outside investor will have the same effect in a shorter period of time. Because the outside
investor is paying for the establishment and silvicultiiral costs, the minimum and maximum
cash flows are balanced and focused around the initial loss of livestock and revenue and
harvesting profits. Farms B and C will have the same patterns, but because they are
investment properties rather than family income properties the sensitivities are important
only for understanding the cash flow. Table 4 shows the forestry effects on the cash flow
for the whole farm without a joint venture. Farm E and Farm F have planted 64% and
76% of their farms in trees. With the exception of minimal imderstory grazing they have
converted the annual cash flows generating land and are more sensitive to the forgone
grazing revenue. In contrast. Farm D has only converted one percent of the total land and
while his cash flows fluctuate he has enough grazing revenue to carry the forestry
investments. While Table 40 illustrates the cash flows over time. Table 13 shows the
direct relationship between forgone grazing revenues and cash flows. Even if an investor
covers the cost of the silviculture, the landowner will still be affected by the forgone
grazing revenue on the planted areas.
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An investment partner decreases the risks and reduces the variability cash flows
over time. Consequently, from a farmers point of view, the ideal partnership in
agroforestry investment would involve the fermer being compensated for the net farming
revenue lost as a result of introducing trees and receive a portion of the forestry revenue
before harvest. The sheep and beef farming industry in New Zealand is characterized by
many farmers in financial difBculties (MAF, 1997). They may not be in debt or threat of
foreclosure but they are certainly making choices to reduce expenditures. Although they
may be interested in diversifying their income, relatively few farmers have the ability to
sustaki the reductions in income that come from displacing their livestock with trees.
While some farmers can sustain this displacement, a joint venture investment partner is the
solution for others. A traditional joint venture arrangement involves the distribution of
profit at the end of the rotation based on inputs over the life of the trees. Because a
formers overhead costs remain largely unchanged, this traditional distribution does not
address the short term revenue loss.
An alternative to traditional joint ventures is the landowner receiving a lump simi
payment. The former would accept a discounted risk free amount now based on likely
forecasted revenue losses. (MoF, 1989). Another alternative would involve compensating
the landowner for the forgone grazing revenue with an annual annuity. Over the life of the
investment, the farmer would receive an annual payment based on the present value of the
lump sum. These methods could be used for farmers who are short of working capital and
make joint ventures more accessible.
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Joint Venture Analysis
The underlying question regarding planting trees and joint ventures in particular is
what proportion of the final net revenues fi-om the sales of the trees would be required to
compensate an investor who met the early costs of silviculture, grazing forgone, or both?
All of the values indicate that the chosen discount rate and the regime/site particulars
radically affect where the threshold falls.
The value of the project land and the fixed costs or a portion of the fixed costs
usually determine the landowner and investor costs and revenue distributions. The
contribution of the land value to the total direct costs determines the allocations. It is
important to note that total revenues are made up of forestry revenues and, if applicable,
the revenues fi-om grazing under the trees. For example, if the landowner pays for the
entire land cost, which is 32% of the total costs and receives all of the project grazing
revenues, then the landowner's share of the forestry revenues is adjusted to take into
account the received grazing income. Consequently, the values in Table 17 reflect these
adjustments.

Although the specific results vary, table 17 indicates the landowner share of

the harvest revenue is dependent on the value of the land used for the project.
Table 18 illustrates the range of revenue and cost distributions over time. The
discount rate affects not only the dollar value of the investment, but the NPV of the
project to each party and the revenue distributions to the landowner and the investor. To
assess the threshold for investor compensation, the discount rates effect on the project
must be examined. Because of the discovint rates affect on the NPV, the value of a
sequence of annual flows is less when you require a high rate of return on your investment
than when you require a low rate. To ascertain the threshold value, you want the value of
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the future cash flow payments to be equal or exceed your initial investment. The amount
of excess or profit depends on the discount rate.
While the discoimt rate affects the NPV, it also affects the distribution of costs and
revenues. Specifically, the final revenues wiU receive a higher weighting at low discoimt
rates and the initial costs will receive a higher weighting at high discount rates. As a
result, when the forestry cost and revenue distributions are allocated according to the
landowner covering 100% of the land and fixed costs, the discount rate affects the relative
forestry cost and revenue distributions between landowner and investor. For each
discount rate, the results of the decision making variables change
Specifically, in all of the case studies except for Farm D, a higher discoimt rate will
increase the forestry revenue distributed to the landowner and decrease the forestry
revenue to the investor by the same proportion (Table 18). Regardiag forestry costs, a
higher discount rate will increase the costs distributed to the landowner and decrease the
costs distributed to the investor proportionally. The range of distribution allocations over
the range of discount rates depend on the grazing revenues and the labor and costs tables
for each project.
In contrast, in both joint venture projects on Farm D the relationships between
discount rates and distributions are inverted. A higher discount rate will decrease the
forestry revenue distributed to the landowner and increase the forestry revenue distributed
to the investor by the same amount. With a non-discounted distribution and the
landowner covering 100% of the land and fixed costs, the range of forestry revenue
distributed to the landowner and investor between a zero discount rate and a discount rate
of 10 is 20.81%. A higher discount rate will decrease the forestry costs distributed to the
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landowner and increase the costs distributed to the investor proportionally. The
difference between a non-discounted allocation of forestry costs and a discount rate of
10% is 6.82 percentage points.

This is because at the higher discount rate the initial

costs receive more weight and the initial costs redistribute the costs and revenues
proportionally.
When assessing the NPV over the fixed percentage distributions to the landowner
and investor of 20/80, 30/70, 40/60 and 50/50, the numbers suggest that over a range of
discount rates the greatest NPV is not the same for the landowner and the investor. At
the same discoimt rate over a range of distributions, the landowner has the highest NPV
with approximately a 50% contribution of the costs yielding 50% of the revenue. The
NPV for the investor is greatest with an 80% contribution of the costs yielding 80% of the
revenue. Nevertheless, the actual project designs do not yield constant distributions
regardless of the discount rate. Because the distributions of costs and revenues vary with
the discount rate, each of the joint ventures illustrates actual scenarios that fall somewhere
in between the ideal scenarios for the landowner and the investor. Consequently, in each
joint venture one party is favored over the other. To maximize returns, the landowner and
the investor would want to choose the point where the discount rate is close to the IRR.
The distributions as well as the NPVs at each discoimt rate vary widely across all of the
joint ventures.

Discussion of IRR
While it is difiBcult to ascertain the individual investors costs of capital, the IRR
"decision rule" Droms (1998) states that any project with an IRR greater than or equal to
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the investors cost of capital shoixld be accepted. This study assiuned that each paddock
was equally productive and did not evaluate the marginal returns on the grazing in the
paddock[s] proposed for forestry. Therefore while the IRR is a useful tool, the NPV is
the figiire used to evaliaate the quantifiable returns on the investment to both parties.
Because the percentage of the costs and revenues covered by the landowner and investor
vary based on the fixed and land costs of the landowner, the IRR and the NPVs are
different for each party. However, when one assumes that the costs and revenue
distributions are fixed and proportional at 20/80, 30/70. 40/60 and 50/50
landowner/investor costs and revenue distributions, the IRR remains constant while the
NPVs are different for each party and each allocation. The values are shown in figures 1
through 5.
While the land and fixed costs determine one set of distributions these may not
yield the highest NPVs for both the landowner and the investor. All farms indicate that
the greater percentage of costs incurred by each party the greater the NPV of their
investment. However, if the landowner only contributes the fixed overhead and the land
value, the forestry investment may not be the highest. Similarly, if the investor only
contributes the difference between the landowner's contribution to costs and the total
direct costs, the investor return may not be maximized. Some arrangements favor the
investor while others fevor the landowner. Additionally, the thresholds that maximize the
benefits to one or both parties are dependent on the discoimt rate each party chooses.
For the farmer, the economic decision to plant trees is about cash flow, internal
rates of return, timing, and risk.

The research indicates that cost and revenue

distributions to the farm based on fixed costs and land value do not necessarily maximize
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the landowner's investment potential of a joint venture. However, if a landowner has a
surplus of land and can afford the forgone grazing revenue on less productive paddocks,
the effect of the agroforestry project on the NPV of the whole farm indicates that a joint
venture is a profitable idea. The joint venture allows the landowner to diversify income
without the outlay of cash capital beyond the overhead. Regardless of the alternate land
use, the landowner will enjoy the benefits of an increase in cash flows at the time of
harvest.
The investor needs to decide if the forgone revenue fi-om the farmer's contribution
of land value and fixed costs outweighs the NPV of directly purchasing the land. For
example. Farm B and Farm C are both 100% investor-owned properties. These
partnership NPVs indicate that purchasing the land outright has been a good investment
during a period when real land values have been increased. Not only do they have the
trees, but they also have the value of the land itself However, depending on their
objectives, a joint venture saves them the cash capital investment of purchasing the land
and provides them a reasonable return. While it is not quantifiable, a joint venture does
require a considerable amount of emotional energy and sensitivity from both parties. If an
investor is not prepared to meet the landowner's objectives and address their needs then
perhaps the partnership or 100% fimded property is a better idea.

Critique of Management Regimes
Although the results reflect the outcome from a variety of inputs for each ferm,
there are several other variables that could be altered to substantially change the returns.
For example, each farm has a reasonably intensive silviculture management system applied
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to the forestry projects. To reduce the costs of the silviculture labor, one could plant
fewer stems per hectare, manage the trees with non- pruning regime, or forgo thinning.
Genetic improvement can play a role in the total recoverable yield of merchantable timber.
While the measurable affects of genetic improvement are variable, estimates of potential
yield increases are greater than 20%. (Jarvis, 1989) Therefore, genetic improvement may
allow lower initial stockings and a series of cost savings in establishment and tending. In
addition to the direct gains in growth and form with a final crop, genetic improvement can
enhance returns fi-om pruning. Finally, improvement to disease resistance will reduce
protection costs, enhance greater wood production, and reduce investment risk.

Non market benefits
In addition to the economic benefit of trees on pastures, there are less quantifiable
benefits that can influence overall farm productivity and health. For example, trees
provide shelter and shade for the livestock.

This enhanced microclimate can contribute

to reducing overall stock stress. Second, the shelter and shade can reduce the risks of
mortality in lambs and sheared sheep by sheltering temperature-vulnerable stock.
the influence of shelter and shade can have an affect on pastoral productivity.

Third,

For

example, the pastvire productivity of stony shallow soils is positively affected by shelter
which reduces evapotranspiration rates. Radcliffe (1985) recorded a 60% improvement
in dryland pastoral production due to shelter on a Canterbury ferm with low water holding
capacity (Jarvis et al, 1989). Fourth, in the social surveys measuring why farmers plant
trees the results suggested that aesthetics are highly valued by farmers. While it has not
been quantifiably proven, the enhanced working environment may have a positive effect on
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overall farm labor productivity.

Fifth, income diversity enhances security. A farm that

has variety of tradeable commodities has more flexibility and therefore increased financial
security. Finally, a farm with added aesthetic amenities and diversified income potential
may be more marketable, providing an increase in both price and speed of sale.
The owner fimded farm forestry venture demonstrates that if a landowner has the
cash capital to invest in forestry he will financially and environmentally benefit fi-om the
diversification. Farm A is an illustration of a successful agroforestry project. While it was
initially accepted by the immediate community with reluctance, their environmental
stewardship ethic has become a model for many landowners in the Bay of Plenty. Farm B
emerged as the direct result of individuals who concluded that they could have more
control and greater financial return if they purchased land and hired a manager. The
partnership arrangement allows a smaller financial commitment and greater flexibility.
Farm C is an exemplary model of investor-owned multiple use. The owners are
implementing land class suitability principles and the diversity and sensitivity to the
existing fi-amework and contours of the land provide a model for others. Farms D, E and
F aU illustrate that joint ventures can be profitable for both the landowner and investment,
but the financial returns are largely dependent on the input variables and the distributions.

Conclusion
While the most recent survey of farmers' attitudes was collected in 1995,
additional studies need to be conducted to evaluate current attitudes if a large-scale joint
venture program is to be implemented.

Furthermore, in spite of the quantifiable and

qualifiable data illustrating what parameters if any drive land conversion and what planting
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regimes will maximize forestry investments for the landowner and the investor; the time
spent with landowners over tea and driving in their truck indicated that the decision to
plant trees is largely a personal one. The most successfiil forestry investments are created
with a landowner who loves trees.
This study attempts to answer some preliminary questions about small scale
forestry investments, but it uncovers some additional areas that need to be addressed.
Illustrated by the sociological studies, (Morey, 1986) the perception of the landowners
does not represent a group who plants trees for economic reasons. Consequently, some
land management plans with specific objectives need to be developed and marketed to
farmers. Second, while many groups and individuals are working to better understand the
environmental and economic advantages of planting trees on pasture lands, there seems to
be a need for a non-biased informational exchange agency to bridge the gap between
forestry and agriculture industries. Third, there is no national database available in New
Zealand for inventorying registered forestry rights agreements. There may be a need to
facilitate dialogue and the exchange of information among those landowners who have or
are interested in diversifying their agricultural land with trees.
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Appendix 1 Growth Model Details
Model number 9 NAPIRAD
The model is available
This model can grow backwards
Genetic Gain is allowed.
Description NAPIRAD P.RAD 1983 M. Lawrence
Database 207 plots (few imthinned)
Submodels
Default height model: Type H Number 26

Basal Area
Height
Stocking
Site Index
Age

model data ranges
warmngs
mm max
0.6
90.3
3.6
47.0
99
2772
20.6 38.5
4-1
29.2

error
min
0.0
0.0
1
1.0
0.0

max
200.0
99.9
10000
99.9
99.9

Model number 22 PPM88
The model is available
This model can grow backwards
Genetic Gain is allowed.
Description PPM** P.Rad RO Pxraiice Plateau 1988
Database 297 plots (2295 meas.) from Kaingaroa, Tarawera.
Submodels
Default height model: Type H Number 34

Basal Area
Height
Stocking
Site Index
Age

model data ranges
wammgs
min max
79.3
0.5
2.6
51.0
89
5239
22.5 39.4
2.8
38.0

error
min
0.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
0.0

max
200.0
99.9
10000
99.9
99.9

